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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
Boards’ affects performance through their monitoring and 
advising functions. The ability to perform these functions 
depends on among other things, the experience of the board. 
This paper examines the effects of corporate board experience 
on firms’ financial performance of listed companies in the 
Nairobi Securities Exchange for the period 2001-2010 using 
System GMM. Performance variables are ROA, Tobin’s Q 
ratio, share price and price to book value.  Experience is 
measured as stock of initial experience and tenure in a 
particular board.  Tenure is found to be positively and 
significantly associated with the performance variables. 
Tenure ^2 captures the entrenchment behavior of the board. 
This entrenchment effect has a significantly negative effect on 
performance. This negative effect eventually outweighs the 
positive tenure effect and gives rise to the downward effect of 
tenure on performance hence the inverted U-relationship 
between tenure and performance. The study reports an optimal 
tenure of between 7 and 8 years depending on the 
performance variable being considered. At shorter tenure; 
there is a positive effect on performance, but at a longer 
tenure, entrenchment behavior of the veteran board members 
outweighs the monitoring effect. In fact these long tenured 
boards become ‘zombie boards’, thus negatively affecting 
performance. Stock of initial experience consists of education, 
and past managerial experience. It has a significant positive 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The basic motivation of owners of capital is to maximize their wealth by enhancing value of the firm. 
The objective of the agent on the other hand may be varied including enhancement of personal 
income, tenure prestige, continuity in employment, and increased bargaining strength for future 
income maximization (Clarke, 2004; Monks & Minow, 2008). This divergence of interests between 
the agent and the principal usually leads agents to engage in those activities which maximize their 
chosen interest of continued employment. This is more pronounced in situations where controls, 
ratifications and sanctioning of managerial decisions are not effective, either by the board or due to the 
fact that the shareholders are not empowered enough to effectively control management. To remedy 
such misalignments of interests, a number of governance mechanisms aimed at aligning the interests 
of the agents and the principals are employed (Clarke, 2004; Monks & Minow, 2008). One mechanism 
is for the owners to choose a board of directors to intermediate the two contrasting interests and ensure 
that the interests of the shareholders are met through the management decisions. In certain cases some 
of the owners sit on these boards to directly take care of the shareholders’ interests. In other instants, a 
completely neutral board is appointed to perform the oversight (monitoring) role (Monks & Minow, 
2008). The board therefore performs two key functions; monitoring (oversight) and advisory. These 
functions are closely related in that for one to advice, there must be some degree of monitoring. 
Conversely for one to monitor, there must be some degree of advising. The core aim of these functions 
is to safeguard the interest of the shareholder which is; to maximize their wealth (Falaye, Hoitash, & 
Hoitash, 2011; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Monks & Minow, 2008). The oversight role requires 
independent boards. Board independence is inversely correlated with tenure. The longer the tenure, the 
less independent, as other interests of the board members begins overshadow their monitoring role. In 
order to prevent such an eventuality, boards are appointed on fixed renewable terms. The shareholders 
reserve the right to change the boards at the annual general meetings in cases of underperformance or 
at the expiry of their terms in office. On the other hand, advising is directly correlated with tenure. 
Advisory role requires boards that are familiar with the company, industry and well endowed with 
insight and experience (Masulis & Mobbs, 2011).   
The main issue therefore, is how to make the boards more effective in their monitoring role so as to 
maximize the shareholders’ wealth. This role is at the heart of the Agency theory. The boards’ 
advisory role which argues that a board brings in useful experience and networks and saves costs 
through timely advice and exploitation of its vast network is at the heart of the Resource Dependence 
theory of corporate governance. These two theories are at the centre of the debate on the role of 
director’s heterogeneity on financial performance. On the one hand, there are schools of thought who 
argue that the monitoring function would ensure less wastage and a maximization of the shareholders’ 
interest. Another school of thought argues that what is crucial, is the advice and networks that the 
diverse board brings with it which is crucial to maximizing shareholders’ value. This is achieved 
through a cost reduction as timely decisions are made and wastages reduced due to experience and the 
subsequent efficiency gained in decision making ( Fracassi & Tate, 2012). 
1.1 Background 
There are various cases of corporate failures which points at ineffective boards. In some of the cases, 
the management decisions raise the fundamental question on the integrity, competence and 
effectiveness of the corporate boards. Mumias sugar factory’s wores is an indictment on corporate 
governance in Kenya.  In the company’s water bottling plant in which over 220 million Kenyan 
shillings was invested, the project made no profit and the project was neither its core business nor part 
of the company’s by-products. It was however approved by the board. In a study by Oyieke (2002), 
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Kenya airways was a case of successful privatization, however less than two decades later; the airline 
is a loss maker in dire need of government bail-out of Kshs. 4.2 billion. The problems of the airline 
points wrong strategic decisions which were approved by the board.  Haco Tiger Brand managing 
director with the approval of the board invested Kshs. 100 billion in the Mavoko housing project 
which has turned out to a bad investment decision. This decision had the board’s approval. At Telcom, 
the ex-staff wants the board investigated for failing to pay kshs 3.2 billion severance settlements.  The 
largest share holder at British American Insurance Company (BRITAM) is accused of fraud, money 
laundering and embezzlement.  At Uchumi supermarkets it is the second time the supermarket chain is 
seeking huge amounts of money for bail out (BD, 2015). All along the financial reports indicated a 
robust enterprise. These cases points squarely to corporate boards that have failed to execute their 
primary mandate to monitor and advise management. The corporate landscape in Kenya is replete with 
such costly, poorly thought through and badly executed white elephants and begs the question as to the 
competency, and commitment of these board to monitor and advice these organizations. 
 
In terms of executive remunerations, the corporate landscape in Kenya defies the expectations 
especially for a developing country. The executive pay for the top ten listed companies at the NSE is 
at par with their profit growth at 21%.  These directors earn 1.4% of their companies’ net earnings 
(NSE, 2011, ROK,2014). The directors (CEO and CFO) of Safaricom collectively earn over 200 
million a month (BD, 2015). In the embattled Kenya Airways, the Chief Finance and Chief executive 
officers split Kshs. 85 million a month (BD, 2015). Most of these top managers own substantial shares 
hence earning handsome dividends as well. 
These incidences points to boards that are either out-rightly misplaced or whose interests are variance 
with those of the share holders. The results of this poor corporate governance are erosion of investor 
confidence, colossal loss of investor’s funds and a down grading of Kenya’s global competitive 
ranking from 106 to 144 (ROK, 2014).  
The study therefore aims at investigating the relationship between the board experience and corporate 
financial performance in Kenya between 2001 and 2010. This broad aim is achieved through 
specifically analyzing the relationship between boards’ tenure, boards’ education and past experience, 
and boards’ entrenchment behavior (tenure^2) on performance variables. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
   2.1 Theoretical Perspective on the Heterogeneity-Performance Relationship 
A basic proposition is that the composition of the board affects the way the board performs its core 
functions of monitoring and advising. The boards’ heterogeneity affects performance by influencing 
management dynamics (Clarke, 2004; Okpara, 2011).   A heterogeneous board is crucial as it brings to 
the organization rich human capital, diverse experience, diverse social capital, diverse abilities and 
views, different behavioral perspectives, diverse networks, and different socio-psychological 
orientations which are crucial in group dynamics. These contributions increases with diversity of past 
experience which brings to bear the rich background and exposure necessary for a competitive 
business environment and the cumulative experience in a particular board (tenure) which improves the 
quality of decisions and reduces the length of time it takes to make a decision (Fracassi & Tate, 2012; 
Okpara, 2011; Pitelis, 2012; Rhode & Packel, 2010; Rose, 2007; Yangmin & Cannella, 2010). 
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There is however no single theoretical perspective on the nature of the relationship between the 
boards’ heterogeneity and financial performance. There is an amalgamation of economic, human 
relations, sociological, political, and organization theories which discusses some aspects of these 
relationships. The most relevant theories reviewed in this paper are the resource dependency and 
human capital theories. 
This study integrates both the human capital theory and resource dependancy theory to come up with a 
relevant theoretical framework(Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Theoretically, the argument  for 
board diversity (heterogeneity) is mixed. There are a number of theoretical arguments in favour of a 
mixed board. (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010) argued that a more diverse board is able 
to make decisions based on the evaluation of more alternatives compared to a homogeneous board 
which suffers from “group think”. This diversity may not necessarily be achieved primarily from 
compositional effect, but also from time effect. Board diversity therefore increases the firms’ capacity 
to link with global and domestic markets, expand access to global and domestic talent pools, and 
strengthen social capital. Those with political experience and networks can help firms deal with 
government bureaucracy hence saving on substantial costs (Goldman, et al., 2009).  
The litrature on board heterogeneity does not conclusively handle heterogeneity in a growing 
democracy, ethnically fragmented society where board composition does not only consider experience 
and qualification, but also affirmative actions. The literature is also devoid of cases where interlocking 
boards include members who serve in both public and private company boards. In Kenya, most of the 
board chairs are previous powerful CEOs (60%), such boards may defy the theoretical and empirical 
position on monitoring. Where the board has a number of prevoius top level management even if 
tenure is short, monitoring will be optimized.  
Experience is acquired through human capital (knowledge) accumulation.  Knowledge and skills can 
be classified into two dimensions: functional (education and training) and organization specific 
(tenure). Effective boards require that directors have a set of functional skills or relationship skills with 
the external networks to obtain information and analyze business issues relevant for advising and also 
acquire sufficient knowledge of the firms operation to be able to oversight management (Forbes & 
Milliken,1999).  Organization-specific skills and knowledge relates to the possession of detailed 
information and deeper understanding of operations and internal management issues. These skills are 
acquired cumulatively based on the tenure in a specific board (Sahghal, 2013; Vafeas, 2003). Directors 
need to acquire both knowledge and skills to be able to make consistent decisions and contribute 
positively to the advising and monitoring roles.  
Experience can be modeled as a function of the initial stock of education and past experience gained in 
similar positions or directorship in other firms, and time spent on a particular board (tenure) 
2
21 TTkEPi ββ −+=                            ……. (1) 
Where iEP  is experience in firm I, ik  is the stock of education and past managerial experience of the 
board members prior to joining the present board, including interlocking directorship, 1β the effect of 
tenure of the board on experience, T tenure is the average number of years the members have been on 
the  current board, 2T is the average  change of boards behavior 2β  is the effect of change of boards 
behavior on experience. 
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The notion of board independence assumes that directors will monitor and advise management to the 
same degree over the directors’ tenure. However management friendliness hypothesis suggests that 
seasoned directors are more likely to befriend management and hence be less likely to play their 
monitoring role on management effectively  as a result of entrenchment (Hwang & Kim, 2009; 
Vafeas, 2003).This occurs as  relationships forms between management and boards overtime  which 
tends to compromise the boards’ independence, in which case directors may qualify as independent, 
yet fail to exercise that independence due to the “friendliness” that have developed overtime  with 
management (Huang, 2013; Hwang & Kim, 2009). When terms are limited, the tendency could be less 
monitoring towards the end of the term or alternatively more vigilant towards the end of term, hence 
monitor keenly if they expect an extension of their term. Whichever the direction, the behavior is 
determined by the individual directors post term expectations.  In this respect the members’ age could 
be crucial. Those still below the ceiling age for qualifying as directors, but have finished the 
mandatory term in a given organization, may play it safe and not rock the boat as they expect future 
appointments. Those finishing their mandatory term and have reached the ceiling age may monitor 
more closely as they want to leave behind a legacy (Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Guner, Malmender, & 
Tate, 2008; Hwang & Kim, 2009).  
Knowing the external environment and having varied industry and environmental experience is also 
critical in the performance of the strategic advisory role of the board. In this regard, a board needs to 
have a deep knowledge of the industry and have functional networks (Fracassi & Tate, 2012). Such 
knowledge is acquired through the diversity of prior experience before joining the board. Board tenure 
is a function of board composition (compositional effect) and time effect. Board tenure can change due 
to a change in board composition( Erhardt, Werbel &Shrader 2003). Board tenure could also change 
due to passage of time (time effect) (Huang, 2013). In the monitoring function, there is a substitution 
between the board as a monitor and the shareholders as a monitor.  Where the shareholders are 
empowered, boards’ monitoring functions are performed by the shareholders. However, firms with 
weak shareholders’ right, benefits more from stronger monitoring by the board. 
 The role of powerful CEOs cannot be overlooked in all these as they may influence the composition 
of the board. In this process of influence, their aim is to have a ‘cozy’ board. This is very prevalent in 
cases where the CEO is an owner, a major shareholder or in case of public corporation where the CEO 
is well connected politically (Adams, Almeida, Ferreira, 2005; Hambrick & Fukitomis 1991). In this 
case, the CEO would wish to shift the composition of the board to favor them by weakening the 
monitoring function by preferring long tenured board members. A board with members from 
professional associations such as bankers, accountants, lawyers, may not be free from the requirements 
of these external bodies. Hence the discharge of their monitoring and advising function is moderated 
by their professional bodies (Guner, et al., 2008).   
        2.2 Empirical Studies 
In a study of Swedish firms, (Thorsell & Anders, 2012) reported no significant relationship between 
experience and performance. They expanded the definition of experience to include external ties 
(interlocking directorships), managerial experience, age and venture capital ownership. (McIntyre, et 
al., 2007) in their study on board composition and performance, reports that experience had a positive 
correlation with performance. (Finkle, 1998) reports that experience as measured through board size, 
directors’ reputation as scholars, and directors’ financial expertise, had significant positive effect on 
firms’ performance. In a study by (Howton, 2006), it reported that longer tenure among board 
members (the average being 7.38 years), was significantly related to firms’ performance. According to 
(Kang, Chen, & Gray, 2007), managerial experience had significant positive association with firms’ 
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performance. This was due to the industry experience and problem solving skills that they bring with 
them. Hence their advice is taken more seriously by management and this cuts down on wastage and 
costs hence improving financial performance. (Bodnaruk, Kendel, Massa, & Simonov, 2008) reported 
that more experienced directors are more independent, wiser, use resources economically and 
experiment less in their decisions. This leads to timelier, less costly decisions and better performance 
in organizations. Hence experience has a positive association with firms’ performance. Experience is 
positively and significantly associated with age. Hence the older, the more generally experienced the 
person is (Vafeas, 2003). (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008) reported that firm specific knowledge 
positively affects the quality of advice that boards render to management. Hence tenure is positively 
associated with performance. (Hambrick & Fukitomis, 1991) showed that generally managers tend to 
engage in more incremental and routine learning after about 2.5 years with the firm. Therefore tenure 
is positively correlated with performance. 
 
Holding board composition constant, (Huang, 2013) showed that board tenure exhibits an inverted U- 
shaped relationship with firm’s value. (Huang, 2013), further reports that the accumulation of firm-
specific knowledge results in better acquisition decisions, better disclosure of value-relevant 
information in financial statements and a higher likelihood of engaging in innovation. However, this 
effect is only up to a threshold level of board tenure. As tenure continues to increase, (Huang, 2013) 
argues that boards become “Zombie Boards” due to a decline in their ability to oversight management 
as they become cozy with management. The results seems to suggest that for additional year of tenure, 
the benefits of the learning dominates for ‘younger’ boards while the costs of entrenchment dominates 
for ‘older’ boards (Huang, 2013). 
Empirical evidence shows that firms with more complex operations and firms with more intangible 
assets have greater advising needs. Due to such needs, these firms have larger board size and greater 
insider representation on the boards (Coles, et al., 2008) as their need for firm specific knowledge is 
higher. The knowledge used for advising is also used for monitoring as it allows boards to identify 
weaknesses and consider the firms’ exposure to risk in the context of its operating environment for 
more complex firms, the maximum firm value is reached at an average tenure of 11.2 years, while for 
more R & D intensive firms, the maximum firm value is reached at an average tenure of 10.4 years. 
The empirically observed peak value in the relationship between Tobin’s Q-ratio and board tenure is 
around 8 years (Huang 2013).  With all control variables held constant at their relative means, for 
average board tenure of three years, an additional year of tenure increases firm value by an average of 
0.45%, while for an average board tenure of 15 years adding one year to a board tenure decreases firm 
value by an average of 0.52%. These results are consistent with the interpretation that the marginal 
value of learning exceeds the marginal cost of entrenchment when board tenure is shorter, but that 
entrenchment effect dominates the learning effect as board tenure continues to increase (Huang 2013).  
(Vafeas, 2003) found that an individual board member may influence the others in monitoring 
management as the less tenured members “respect experience”. If the longest tenured member exits, 
there will be a change in the mean tenure and the influence pattern will change. The decision making 
processes and even the quality of the decision will change. This can be considered as an ‘experience 
shock’ to the board. Hence board dynamics changes every time a board is subjected to a shock such as 
exit or death of a long tenured member (Huang, 2013). Recent studies that examined how prior social 
relationship between CEOs and directors affect firm performance and corporate decisions, found that 
network ties between directors and CEOs weakens the intensity of board monitoring (Fracassi & Tate, 
2012), hence tenure is negatively associated with performance. (Bill, Hasan, & Wu, 2012) found no 
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significant relationship between directors’ tenure and firms’ financial performance for the Finnish 
firms they studied. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
In studying the association between diversity variables and financial performance, endogeneity could 
pose a problem. Endogeneity will lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make 
reliable inferences virtually impossible. Assuming  
itiititit xyy µηβα +++= −1  ………… (2) 
For i=1,..,N, and t=2,…,T, with 1<α . The disturbance iη  and itµ  have the standard properties, that 
is E( iη )=0 , E( itµ )=0, therefore the E( iη , itµ )=0 for i=1,…,N, and t=2,…, T.  Additionally, the time 
varying errors are assumed uncorrelated; 
E( ISµ , itµ )=0 for i=1,…,N, and ∀  t≠ s. No additional conditions are imposed on the variance of
itµ , hence moment conditions used below do not require homoscedasticity. 
itx  is assumed to follow an autoregressive process.: 
ititiitit xx εθµτηρ +++= −1      ……………….. (3) 
For i=1,…,N and t=2,…T, with ρ =1. such that E( itε )=0 and E( iη , itε )=0 for i=1,…N, and t=2,…T. 
Two sources of endogeneity exist in the itx  process: i) the fixed-effect component iη , has an effect on 
itx  through a parameter 1−τ  implying that ity  and itx  have both steady state determined only by iη
.  ii) the time-varying disturbance itµ  impacts itx  with a parameter θ . By using lagged values of the 
dependent variables as instruments, the endogeneity problem is eliminated. This is because the lagged 
value of the dependent variable is uncorrelated with the error term but correlated with the explanatory 
variables in the model (Soto 2010, Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). 
   3.1 The theoretical Model 








, )( υηλβα ,  t=q+1,…,T,; i=1,…,N,      ……..(4) 
Where iη  and tλ  are individual and time specific effects respectively, itx  is a vector of explanatory 
variables, )(Lβ  is a vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator and q is the maximum lag 
length in the model. The number of time periods available on the i th individual iT , is small and the 
number of individual N is large. 
Identification of the model requires restrictions on the serial correlation properties of the error term itυ
and/or on the properties of the explanatory variables itx . It is assumed that if the error term was 
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originally autoregressive, the model has been transformed so that the coefficients iα ’s and 'iβ s 
satisfy some set of common factor restrictions. Thus only serially uncorrelated or moving average 
errors are explicitly allowed. The itυ   are assumed to be independently distributed across individuals 
with zero mean. The itx   may or may not be correlated with the individual effects tα , and for each of 
these cases they may be strictly exogenous, predetermined or endogenous variables with respect to itυ .  
In this dynamic model we apply first difference transformation as it eliminates iη from the transformed 
error term without at the same time introducing all lagged values of the disturbance itν into the 
transformed error term. This transformation allows the use of suitably lagged endogenous variable as 
instruments (Arrelano & Bond 1991; Stock & Yogo, 2005).  If we have a balance panel, p=1, and 
there are no explanatory variable nor time effects, the itν are serially uncorrelated, and the initial 
conditions y; 1 are uncorrelated with itν for t=2,…, T., then using first difference we have: 
Eguations                                                             Instruments available 
323 iii yy να ∆+∆=∆                                            1iy            
  434 iii yy να ∆+∆=∆                                         1iy , 2iy   
iTiTiT yy να ∆+∆=∆                                          1iy , 2iy ,… 2, −Tiy , 
If the model is mean stationary, then the first differences ity∆ will be uncorrelated with iη ,hence 
1, −∆ tiy  can be used as instrument in the level equations (Stock & Yogo, 2005). Hence in addition to 
the instruments available for the first differenced equations, we then have: 
Equation                                                              Instruments available 
323 iiii yy νηα ++=                                             2iy∆  
434 iiii yy νηα ++=                                            3iy∆   
iTiiTi yy νηα ++=− 31,                                         1, −∆ Tiy  
 
 
     3.2 The Empirical Model 
ttt cperftenuretenurestexfirmyearperf εβββββ +++++++= − var514
2
321      ….. (5) 
 Performance= Tobins’ Q ratio, ROA, P/B and Share price, diversity= age, experience, board size, 
Previous perform=lagged values of Tobin’s Q ratio, P/B, Share price and ROA. Firm size=natural log 
of the total assets of the company, firm=unique time invariant unobserved firm level characteristics 
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based on firm level fixed effects in the regression estimates, time =time period of that observation. The 
coefficient of interest is iβ , where 0H : iβ =0 and aH : iβ ≠0. 
   
The study will estimate the above equations for the overall sample of 29 firms. These 29 firms’ 
financial performance over the period 2001-2010 in terms of the accounting variable and stock 
variable will be analyzed.  
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics-All Companies 
Variable Observ. Mean Std dev. Min Max Assymptotic Normality 
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The overall boards are relatively large in size with a mean size of 10 members. The boards’ average 
age is 64 years indicating relatively older boards. The average board tenure is 8.2 years implying that 
most members serve more than one fixed term of 4 years. The stock of experience has an average of 
4.91 years an indication that those appointed to the boards have substantial past experience. There is 
considerable interlocking of board members. The performance variables are normally distributed. The 
ROA has a mean of 0.1164 and a standard deviation of 0.1236. There is low use of assets to generate 
wealth in the sample firms. The Q-ratio ranges between 0.0403 and 10.79 and a mean value of 3.678 
implying overvalued stocks. The P/B value has a mean of 1.3895, a minimum of 0.03 and a maximum 
of 9.3. The higher the ratio, the higher the premium the market is willing to pay for the company.  
The study sought to find out the relationship between tenure of the board and the performance 
variables. This assumes that there is correlation between the study variables. The table below shows 
the strength and direction of such relationship. 
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Source: Authors’ Compilation from firm’s annual data  
The table above shows that there is positive correlation between ROA, tenure, interlocking 
directorship and stock of experience. There is however a negative correlation between tenure ^2, 
average age of the board, board size, and firm size. The correlation between the Q-ratio and board 
tenure, stocks of experience, average age, interlocking directorship and firm size is positive.Tenure^2 
and board size are negatively correlated with Q-ratio. Share price is positively correlated with board 
tenure, stocks of experience, average age, interlocking directorship and firm size. It is however 
negatively correlated with Tenure ^2 and board size. Price to book value (P/B) is positively correlated 
with board tenure, stock of experience, interlocking directorship and average age of the board. It is 
however negatively correlated with tenure ^2, board size and firm size.  
 
The negative correlation between tenure ^2 and the performance variables can be explained as 
resulting from the entrenchment behavior of the boards.  As the boards get entrenched, they tend to 
play less of the oversight role as they begin to get friendly with management. This friendly 
relationship with management compromises the quality of monitoring and even the nature of the 
advice they tender to management. They tend to play it safe with their monitoring and advice as their 
personal interests gain prominence as opposed to the interest of the share holders. This negative board 
behavior tends to grow with tenure, hence the parabolic relationship between experience and 
performance as observed also in other empirical studies reviewed in this paper. The relationship 
between the board size and the performance variables is negative. This implies that the larger the 
board, the poorer is the financial performance. This could be attributed to the conflicting interests of 
the board, the heavy financial burden such a board exerts on the organization both direct and indirect; 
there is also the problem of group think and majority rule, which could be manipulated by the 
dominant interests. Tenure is positively correlated with the performance variables. This is explained 
by the fact that the more knowledgeable about the firm, the better the advice the board renders. When 
we integrate the effect of tenure and tenure^2, we get the inverted U relationship between experience 
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and performance. This implies that there is an optimal point at which the negative entrenchment 
behavior outweighs the positive advising behavior. Stock of experience has a positive correlation with 
the performance variables. It implies that the previous experience and the networks built over time and 
the education qualification improves both the advising and monitoring roles of the board. 
The table below shows the result of the system GMM estimation of the relationship between the 
performance variables, and board experience. The table also reports the control variables and how they 
are related to the performance. 
 
Table 3: Board Experience and Firms’ Financial Performance using GMM estimation 
Variable  Q-ratio P/B value ROA Share Price 
























Controls     




























Leverage -2.6584(-3.27)** -0.168 (-2.921)** -0.4939(-2.71)** 0.2667(0.003) 









Observations 199 199 199 199 
No. of parameters 10 10 10 10 
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Transformation used First difference First difference First difference First difference 


























Sigma 1.4351 0.8639 0.1074 47.3098 
Sigma^2 2.0595 0.7463 0.0115 2243.899 
Sigma levels 1.0148 0.6108 0.0759 33.4955 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RSS 389.2458 141.0443 2.1784 424096.9379 
TSS 392.7250 178.2909 2.8591 467986.0716 
No. of individuals 29 (derive from 
year) 
29 (derived from 
year) 




Longest time series 7(2004-2010) 7(2004-2010) 7(2004-2010) 7(2004-2010) 




Wald (Joint) Chi^2(10) 13.35 [0.038]* 23.75 [0.001]** 13.35 [0.038]* 15.85[0.006]** 
Wald(Dummy) 
Chi^2(1) 
18.61 [0.010]** 0.0308 [0.861] 0.002 [0.966] 0.0148[0.908] 
Sargan Test Chi^2 (37) 44.25[0.002]** 16.80[0.000]** 15.47[0.000]** 23.93[0.003]** 
AR (1) test N(0,1) -2.350 [0.019]* -2.821 [0.005]** -1.197 [0.049]* -2.214[0.003]** 
AR(2) test N(0,1) -1.023 [0.306] 0.804 [0.421] 0.627 [0.531] -1.256[0.209] 
Source: Authors Computation. 
Tenure has a positive effect on all performance variables. This conforms to both the empirical and 
theoretical literature reviewed in this study (Hwang & Kim, 2009; Sahghai, 2013) and the theoretical 
literature as reported in (Anderson, et al., 2012; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hillman, et al., 2000; 
Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010). Tenure improves the monitoring role which in turn has a positive 
influence on performance.  Tenure^2 has a negative effect on all performance variables. This 
conforms to the hypothesis that the entrenchment effect of the board negatively affects their 
monitoring function (Goldman, et al., 2009; Huang, 2013; Hwang & Kim, 2009; Vafeas, 2003).  This 
means that the entrenchment effect dominates the learning effect at longer tenure (15 years) Ref 
appendix A-1. This is due to the cozy relationship that develops between management and the 
entrenched board whose other interests begins to dominate the monitoring interest.  As the boards 
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become more entrenched, they tend to overlook some of the management excesses as they seek to 
extract favors from management. This concurs with the empirical results of (Huang, 2013). They 
actually become zombie boards who adopt any proposal from management and fail to critically 
monitor management. The entrenchment behavior eventually compromises the monitoring role. This 
negative effect of an entrenched board can be strong enough to negate the positive effects of both the 
tenure and stock of experience. This gives rise to an inverted U shaped relationship between 
experience and performance with an optimal experience performance level of 7 years for Tobin’s Q-
ratio.   
  The experienced board is less receptive to new ideas and keen to extract more individual benefits. 
This entrenchment cost outweighs the benefit of advice resulting from experience. The simulation in 
this study with different tenure of boards showed that when the simulation was run with tenure below 
the average (8.2 years), there was a positive association, however when the simulation was run with 
tenure above the average age of board tenure, there was a negative association. This concurs with the 
findings of (Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Huang, 2013). The simulation results for up to 15 years (three 
terms) concur with the empirical studies of an inverted U-relationship between experience and 
performance  and tenure and performance as measured by Q-ratio (ref appendix A-1). 
The control variables have the correct sign. Even though a larger board brings in a large pool of past 
experience (stock of experience) according to the resource dependency theory, the boards’ behavior of 
a larger boards, such as the competing interest that leads to intense lobbying and opposing positions 
outweighs the past experience hence board size has significant negative association with performance 
variables except in the case price to book value. This negative association between board size and 
performance variables could be attributed to the resulting agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The size of the firm, significantly affects performance, this concurs with the theoretical and empirical 
literature reviewed.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
The study concludes that there is a significant positive relationship between tenure and performance, 
and experience and performance.  The positive relationship between tenure and performance implies 
that monitoring function improves with tenure. The boards’ entrenchment behavior as proxied by 
Tenure^2 is significantly negative. This implies that as the board gets entrenched; the boards’ 
monitoring role becomes more accommodating, hence failing to check management.  
 The study also concludes that the relationship between tenure and firms’ performance shows an 
inverted U- relationship.  As tenure increases, the entrenchment behavior captured by tenure ^2 
outweighs the positive monitoring role. Hence there is an optimal tenure level at between 7 and 8 
years depending on the sector. 
Finally, advising is negatively correlated with tenure, while monitoring is positively correlated with 
tenure. However, with interlocking directorship and owners sitting on the boards, monitoring and 
advising may not be a trade off. 
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Appendix 













1 0.515 0.775 0.039 21.330 1 0.461 0.909 0.058 23.187 
2 0.97 1.550 0.072 39.308 2 0.916 1.684 0.091 41.160 
3 1.365 1.855 0.099 53.934 3 1.311 1.989 0.118 55.791 
4 1.700 2.292 0.121 65.208 4 1.646 2.426 0.141 67.065 
5 1.975 2.755 0.137 73.130 5 1.921 2.889 0.156 74.987 
6 2.190 2.970 0.148 77.700 6 2.136 3.104 0.167 79.557 
7 2.345 3.078 0.153 78.918 7 2.291 3.212 0.172 80.775 
8 2.440 3.064 0.152 76.784 8 2.386 3.198 0.171 78.641 
9 2.475 2.943 0.146 71.298 9 2.421 3.077 0.165 73.155 
10 2.450 2.710 0.134 62.460 10 2.396 2.844 0.153 64.317 
11 2.365 2.365 0.117 50.276 11 2.311 2.499 0.136 52.133 
12 2.220 1.908 0.094 34.728 12 2.166 2.042 0.113 36.586 
13 2.015 1.339 0.065 15.834 13 1.961 1.473 0.084 17.691 
14 1.750 0.658 0.031 -6.412 14 1.698 0.792 0.051 -4.555 
PAGE 18| Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management | 2016, VOL. 3, Series 3 
 
15 1.425 -0.135 -0.009 -32.010 15 1.371 -0.001 0.010 -30.153 
 
 
 
